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Abstract
In Europe, Muslims are more likely to be unemployed than non-Muslims. Many studies try to explain this employment gap
by human capital and contextual factors on the one hand, and by ethno-religious penalties (discrimination due to religious
affiliation, religiosity, or migration factors) on the other. In these studies, it is normally assumed that human capital me-
diates the effect of Muslim affiliation, and that controlling for human capital will therefore reduce the odds for Muslims
of being unemployed. We replicate the well-known study by Connor and Koenig (2015) along these lines, using the most
recent and representative Swiss data from 2014 (N = 16,487). Our key result is that that the effect of Muslim affiliation on
unemployment is not mediated, but actually moderated by human capital. We find a powerful interaction in that Muslims
both with a very low and a very high level of education are disproportionally often unemployed. This is important because
it means that raising the human capital of Muslims will not automatically lessen, but may instead actually widen, the em-
ployment gap. We discuss possible theoretical mechanisms that might explain this finding.
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1. Introduction
Many recent studies have provided evidence that Mus-
lims face difficulties in entering and succeeding in the la-
bor market in European countries. This has been shown
in specific national contexts (Adida, Laitin, & Vafort,
2010; Cheung, 2014; Khattab, 2009; Khattab & Modood,
2015; Kohler, 2012; Lindley, 2002) and in cross-national
perspectives (Connor & Koenig, 2013, 2015; Heath,
Rothon, & Kilpi, 2008; Tubergen, Maas, & Flap, 2004).
Several studies try to explain this employment gap by
human capital and contextual factors on the one hand,
and to ethno-religious penalties (discrimination, preju-
dice) on the other. In these studies, it is normally as-
sumed that human capital mediates the effect of Mus-
lim affiliation, and that controlling for human capital
will reduce the odds for Muslims of being unemployed.
The central idea is that Muslims in Western European
countries show higher unemployment partly because
of a lack of human capital. Controlling for human cap-
ital and other individual and contextual factors should,
it is thought, reduce the odds of unemployment for
Muslims—and any differences that remain must be ac-
counted for by other mechanisms, such as migratory fac-
tors and factors of religiosity; in short, “ethno-religious
penalties”. Ethno-religious penalties can be defined as
barriers or obstacles that an individual meets when try-
ing to reach a position; these barriers or obstacles are
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created or come into effect because of the ethnic or re-
ligious background of the individual (cf., Heath & Mar-
tin, 2013).
In this study, we engage with this literature by ask-
ing exactly the same questions for a country in which
extensive research on the Muslim employment gap has
not yet been carried out: Switzerland. To gain a focus, we
replicate the methodology of the well-known study by
Connor and Koenig (2015). Specifically, we also test the
implicit assumption made by Connor and Koenig (2015)
that human capital mediates the influence of Muslim af-
filiation on unemployment.
Our key question in this article is therefore: howgreat
is the Muslim employment gap in Switzerland, and to
what extent can it be attributed to human capital, migra-
tory factors, religiosity, and a hostile societal context?
Our most central result is that the “mediation-
assumption” made by the literature does not hold for
the Swiss data. In our data, the effect of Muslim/non-
Muslim affiliation on unemployment is not linearly medi-
ated by human capital variables. In fact, we find a power-
ful interaction in that Muslims both with a very low and
a very high level of education are disproportionally of-
ten unemployed. This is important because it means that
raising the human capital of Muslims will not automati-
cally lessen, but may instead actually widen, the employ-
ment gap. We discuss possible theoretical mechanisms
that might explain this finding.
We use the most recent and representative data on
Switzerland from the 2014 Language, Religion and Cul-
ture Survey provided by the Federal Office of Statistics
(Flaugergues, 2016; Mayer, 2011) with N = 16,487. This
is a high-quality data set that includes goodmeasures for
our different mechanisms.
Switzerland, with its multicultural and federalist his-
tory, is an interesting country to investigate with regard
to the Muslim employment gap for two reasons. First,
Muslims are the largest non-Christian religious minority,
and the question of the presence of Muslims is one of
the most salient themes in public discourse. Switzerland
has experienced a growing religious diversity for the past
sixty years; it has changed from being an almost exclu-
sively Christian society (mainly Catholics and Protestants)
to a pluralist society, including more than 20% “no re-
ligious affiliation” and an increasing number of minor-
ity religions, among which Muslims are the largest with
more than 5% in 2014 (Baumann & Stolz, 2009; Flauger-
gues, 2016). Second, the Swiss population in different
cantons has voted on specific issues related to migra-
tion and religion, allowing us to construct a measure of
the degree of out-group hostility in the cantons and to
test its effect on the Muslim employment gap. Switzer-
land is a so-called “direct democracy”, where people are
called to vote on substantive issues on the national, can-
tonal, and local level at numerous times throughout the
year. These direct democratic instruments can, depend-
ing on how these minorities are perceived as out-groups
and their proportion in the region of residence, lead to
structural discrimination against them (Green, Fasel, &
Sarrasin, 2010; Vatter & Danaci, 2010).
We see a twofold contribution of our article. On the
one hand, we investigate the Muslim employment gap
in Switzerland, a country where this question has not
yet been extensively studied. On the other, we challenge
former research by showing that, for the Swiss case, a
central assumption of many studies—namely, the medi-
ating effect of human capital—does not hold. If our find-
ing carries over to other contexts, it may mean that con-
clusions concerning the Muslim gap must be revised in
many countries.
The plan of our article is standard. We present the
state of the art in Section 2, and the theoretical frame-
work in Section 3. Section 4 is concerned with the
method used, Section 5 presents the results, and Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2. State of the Art
Heath et al. (2008) provide an overview of recent stud-
ies on the educational and labor market outcomes for
second-generation minorities in ten Western European
countries. What strikes the reader is the consistency of
one result that arises from all the studies: Muslims are,
regardless of ethnicity, always the most penalized group.
This consistentMuslim penalty has been addressed from
both national and cross-national perspectives.
A prominent example of a national study is Heath and
Martin (2013), who also tackle the difficult “identifica-
tion problem” (i.e., disentangling ethnicity from religious
belonging) in Great Britain. Their results show a “consis-
tent pattern forMuslimmen andwomen to inwhich they
experience greater labour market penalties than other
members of their co-ethnic groups who belong to other
(or no) religions” (Heath & Martin, 2013, p. 1024). The
Swiss case has not yet received much attention in the
sociological literature on ethno-religious penalties, with
the exception of Kohler (2012), who points to a double
discrimination for Muslim immigrants in Switzerland (be-
ing immigrant and being Muslim) that persists for the
second generation. Two other works have provided ev-
idence of discrimination in Switzerland against Turks and
ex-Yugoslavs (Fibbi, Kaya, & Piguet, 2003), and against
immigrants in general (Golder & Straubhaar, 1999), but
without specifying the effect of religious belonging.
The most prominent example of a cross-national
study is the research by Connor and Koenig (2015). Their
paper aims to determine whether first- and second-
generation Muslims in 17 Western European countries
(including Switzerland) face barriers when entering the
labour market. They use ESS data, pooled across coun-
tries and survey rounds (2002–2012). In their medi-
ation analysis, they estimate logistic regression mod-
els predicting employment. Their null model enters
Muslim/non-Muslim religious affiliation (and controls).
They then estimate different models, with “variable sets,
which capture potential individual-level mechanisms un-
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derlying employment penalties. In this way, explained
variance for the Muslim gap can be determined as each
variable set is introduced” (Connor & Koenig, 2015,
p. 194). They present an overall model as well as a
model for the first and second generation. Their re-
sults show a significant employment gap (6% unemploy-
ment for non-Muslims, against 18% forMuslims). Accord-
ing to their models, 13% of this gap can be explained
by variables capturing human capital; 1% by variables
of religiosity; and 21% by variables measuring migra-
tion factors (Connor & Koenig, 2015, p. 196). Even af-
ter controlling for human capital factors, migratory vari-
ables and socio-demographic characteristics, some vari-
ance between Muslims and non-Muslims remains unex-
plained, which they use as a proxy for possible ethno-
religious discrimination processes.
An important claim of this study is that the differ-
ent variables representing the mechanisms are “mediat-
ing” variables. This means that Muslim/non-Muslim re-
ligious affiliation acts on unemployment “through” the
intermediate variables specified by themechanisms. It is
the methodology of this study that we take as a model
to analyse the Swiss case.
3. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
3.1. Symbolic Boundaries and Social Closure
A first explanation for the Muslim employment gap fo-
cuses on symbolic boundaries and social closure. Accord-
ing to this explanation, a majoritarian non-Muslim soci-
ety may engage in social closure and either consciously
or unconsciously exclude Muslims from employment po-
sitions. Such social closure is often found concerning re-
ligious boundaries or attributes that are highly salient or
“bright” in the respective society (Alba, 2005; Lamont &
Molnár, 2002). In Switzerland, religion can be seen as
a bright symbolic boundary since Islam is officially dis-
tinguished from a presumed “autochthonous culture”: a
ban on building minarets is inscribed in the Constitution
(Mayer, 2011; Rayner & Voutat, 2014), and the state reg-
ulates the religious market, privileging the Catholic and
Reformed Churches. Several studies have highlighted
how being a Muslim in Switzerland constitutes a marker
of “otherness”, especially in media discourses (Behloul,
2009; Lindemann & Stolz, 2014). Fibbi et al. (2003) have
empirically tested the exclusion of second-generation in-
dividuals from majority Muslim countries in Switzerland.
Through a thorough testing method (consisting of send-
ing fictitious resumes and analysing the rate of invita-
tion to a job interview), they demonstrate that Albani-
ans from ex-Yugoslavia and Turks in German-speaking
Switzerland are respectively 59%and30% less likely to be
called back than Swiss people without a migratory back-
ground (Fibbi et al., 2003).
Of course, just because we find a Muslim employ-
ment gap, we cannot immediately conclude that social
closure and discrimination are in operation, as the em-
ployment disparities could be explained by other mech-
anisms. In the following, we therefore present a series
of alternative explanations that might each account at
least in part for the employment differences between
Muslims and the non-Muslim population.
3.2. Human Capital
Being a Muslim might lead to higher unemployment be-
cause of a lack of human capital. As Connor and Koenig
(2015, p. 192) suggest, “[m]ostMuslim immigrants enter-
ing Europe have come from a lower socio-economic class
background compared to the European population as a
whole and sometimes to the other immigrant groups”.
This explanation can apply to the Swiss case too, since
the majority of Muslims have a migratory background.
Furthermore, this fact leads to a situation in which the
second generation of Muslim immigrants grows up in
households with lower socio-economic status and less
human capital than the surrounding society. The link
between human capital and unemployment that under-
lies this argument is well established in the literature.
We define “human capital” as the educational, linguis-
tic, and social resources of an individual (cf., Bourdieu,
1986). This theory suggests that factors such as edu-
cational level, job training, language abilities, parental
socio-economic characteristics, and the density of social
networks should explain most of the variation of profes-
sional performance between individuals, be it in terms
of access to the labourmarket, earnings, or occupational
achievement (Becker, 1964, 1994). The relationship finds
empirical support in recent studies. For example, the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) published a report showing that:
In all OECD countries [including Switzerland], people
with high qualifications have the highest employment
rates, and in most countries, they also have the low-
est risk of being unemployed. At the same time, peo-
ple with the lowest educational qualifications are at
greater risk of being unemployed or out of the labour
market. (Valle, Normandeau, & González, 2015)
Note that the human capital account could at least in
principle explain all or part of the Muslim employment
gap without recourse to any discrimination or “ethno-
religious penalties”. This is not the case for the following
mechanisms, however.
3.3. Religiosity
Higher Muslim unemployment could also be caused by a
religiositymechanism.On this account, employerswould
discriminate not so much against Muslims as such, but
only or particularly highly religious Muslims. Employers
might think that highly religious Muslims could have an
excessive cultural distance from general society, which
could be harmful to their organization either in its inter-
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nal functioning or in the interaction of the organization
with the public, clients, or markets. Well-known exam-
ples are schools and stores that refrain from employing
veiledwomen (for a literature reviewof experiments, see
Weichselbaumer, 2016). Highly religious Muslims may
also be stereotyped as “fanatics” or even associatedwith
Islamic terrorism (Ettinger & Imhof, 2011; Gianni, Giugni,
& Michel, 2015). Highly religious individuals could pre-
sumably be singled out by dress, appearance (e.g., veil,
beard) or information otherwise obtained (e.g., in job in-
terviews). It is empirically difficult to distinguish such so-
cial closure on the basis of religiosity on the one hand,
and ethnicity on the other, but the distinction can and
should be made at least analytically.
3.4. Migration Background
Another complex of factors affecting Muslim affiliation
and higher unemployment are those of migration. Mus-
lims in Switzerland are overwhelmingly either first- or
second-generation immigrants (Flaugergues, 2016), and
migration background is a well-known factor influencing
unemployment in Switzerland (Fibbi et al., 2003; Golder
& Straubhaar, 1999; Kohler, 2012). Just like religion, this
factor can be seen as a bright boundary in Switzerland,
partly because of the strict nationality law in Switzerland,
which is based on the idea of jus sanguinis (Castles &
Miller, 2003). In the light of such bright boundaries, mi-
grants, and especially those working in manual labour,
may havemore difficulty gaining employmentwhen com-
peting with individuals without such a background. As a
disruptive life event, migration can also indirectly affect
unemployment probability by influencing human capital:
through migration, individuals lose their social networks,
are confronted in many cases with a new language, and
may see their educational qualifications not recognized
in the receiving country (Cheung, 2014).
Compared to the first generation of immigrants, the
second generation can expect to see their situation im-
prove because of the human capital (education, linguis-
tic abilities, and social networks) that they have acquired
in the country (Cheung, 2014, pp. 143–144). Other than
this human capital hypothesis, we could expect that em-
ployers do not see individuals of the second generation
as “culturally distant” because of their socialization in the
autochthonous context. In terms of origins (nationality at
birth), we can intuitively expect that non-European ori-
gins are perceived as culturally more distant than Euro-
pean origins. Consequently, employers could favour Eu-
ropeans at the expense of non-Europeans. Also, acquir-
ing Swiss nationality may be seen as an indicator of “inte-
gration” and may help when competing for employment.
3.5. Hostile Context
Finally, a xenophobic context would supposedly impact
on the unemployment chances of individuals from dif-
ferent cultural and religious backgrounds. Studies us-
ing questionnaires have demonstrated that xenophobia
and/or Islamophobia is present in Switzerland (for an
in-depth theoretical discussion of these concepts and
results, see Gianni et al., 2015; Helbling, 2008; Stolz,
2005). The most recent study points to the fact that non-
Swiss Muslims feel discriminated amongst, with 21% of
Turks, 31% of North Africans, and 15% of ex-Yugoslavians
in the sample having had a feeling that they were dis-
criminated against on the basis of their religion in the
past 12 months (Gianni et al., 2015). Hostility towards
immigrants and Muslims is reflected in the political
context of Switzerland, where the campaigns and re-
sults of elections are useful indicators: support for the
“anti-minaret” and “anti-mass-immigration” initiatives,
in 2009 and 2014 respectively, by a majority of Swiss cit-
izens are two of its clearest expressions. Both initiatives
focused strongly (or, with the first initiative, exclusively)
on the alleged threat that Muslims posed to Switzer-
land, Swiss democracy, and Swiss culture. Interestingly,
supporters of the 2014 initiative linked mass migration
with the existence of a (supposedly) ever-growing Mus-
lim population. Here, the borders between Islamopho-
bia and xenophobia are blurred. Cantons differed very
markedly in their support or rejection of these initiatives.
For example, the support given to the anti-minaret initia-
tive by the rural canton of Thurgau was 67.7%, while the
figure for the canton of Geneva was 40.3%.We capitalize
on this important inter-cantonal variation and use the re-
sults of these elections tomeasure the degree of hostility
towards Muslims/immigrants in each canton.
3.6. Accounting for the Muslim Employment Gap and
Ethno-Religious Penalties
Our strategy will first be to ascertain whether there is in
fact a Muslim employment gap in Switzerland. If there
is, we will investigate how much of this gap can be “ac-
counted for” when controlling for human capital, reli-
giosity, migration background, and hostility of context.
Any significant remaining differences that cannot be ex-
plained by human capital can be seen as forms of “ethno-
religious penalties” and can be further unpacked with
the other factors.
4. Methodology
4.1. Sample and Population
To analyse mechanisms accounting for Muslim/non-
Muslim unemployment disparities, we use the most
recent and representative data currently available for
Switzerland: the 2014 Language, Religion and Culture
Survey. Gathered by the Federal Statistical Office (FSO),
this dataset used telephone-based interviews and, in a
second stage, written questionnaires in all cantons of
Switzerland. The response rate was 46.6%. It is a sam-
ple of 16,487 permanent residents aged 15 and above. As
our study focuses on the labour market, we selected only
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work-active individuals: permanent residents aged 16
(age when employment begins) to 64 (age of retirement),
excluding also those individuals not able to work and
those working full-time in the household. Since we anal-
yse differences between Muslims and non-Muslims, we
also excluded peoplewhohadnot answered the question
on their religious affiliation. We use weights provided by
the FSO to calibrate socio-demographic variables.
We end up with a sample of 11,012 individuals, com-
posed of 694 Muslims and 10,318 non-Muslims (namely,
all other religious affiliations and those without a reli-
gious affiliation). In other words, our sample is made up
of 6.3% of Muslims in the active population, which is
slightly more than the 5% of the Muslim population in
the general resident population (Flaugergues, 2016). Be-
cause some variables lack data, the logistic regressions
are runwith a slightly lowerN=10,916 (Muslims n=682;
non-Muslims n = 10,234). Fortunately, only 12 Muslims
had to be excluded for the reason of missing data.
We define as “Muslim” any individual who identifies
himself or herself with Islam or with any specific denom-
ination considered Islamic by the FSO, such as Sunnism,
Shiism, Alevism, and Sufism (Flaugergues, 2016). Non-
Muslims are therefore all individuals who identify them-
selves with other religions or who say that they have
no religious affiliation or are atheist/agnostic. Individu-
als who did not answer the question were excluded from
our sample.
4.2. Variables and Operationalization
Our dependent variable is unemployment, translated
into a binary variable “employed/unemployed”, where
employed is the reference modality. The definition of
“unemployed” in our data is based on the definition pro-
vided by the International Labor Office (OIL), according
to which an unemployed individual is a person who is
available to work but currently not working and who
has been looking for a job for the last four weeks (Wal-
ter et al., 2016). Muslim affiliation was measured by
self-identification.
As in the methodology used by Connor and Koenig
(2015), the different mechanisms accounting for un-
employment differences between Muslims and non-
Muslims are captured by sets of mediating variables:
Human capitalwasmeasured by three variables. Edu-
cation is a four-step variable distinguishing between com-
pleted compulsory schooling, non-compulsory school-
ing (apprenticeship, post-16 education), higher profes-
sional education, and university education (including the
Hochschulen, HEP, HES). A dichotomous variable mea-
sureswhether the interviewer detected no linguistic diffi-
culties or some (small or significant) linguistic difficulties
in the respondent’s answers. Another dichotomous vari-
able captures whether the respondent engages in some
or no voluntary activity (i.e., indicator of social network
as part of human capital) (Nakhaie & Kazemipur, 2013).
Religiosity was measured by an additive scale com-
posedof frequency of attendance at religious services and
frequency of prayer (Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .661). This measure
represents a theoretical and methodological challenge,
like any research dealing with religiosity (Cutting &Walsh,
2007). Tests have been made to make sure biases are not
introduced for Muslim women (not compelled to attend
religious services) and are discussed in the analyses.
Migration background was captured with three vari-
ables. A three-step variable distinguishes autochthonous
individuals from first-generation and second-generation
immigrants. According to the definitions of the FSO, au-
tochthonous individuals are Swiss-born with at least one
parent born in Switzerland, and naturalized individu-
als with both parents born in Switzerland (Flaugergues,
2016). We define second generation as individuals born
in Switzerland or those who arrived before the age of 12
(attended primary school in Switzerland); and first gen-
eration as non-Swiss, foreign-born individuals or those
who arrived after the age of 11. A dichotomous variable
distinguishes between individuals of European and non-
European origin. We define “European” in geographical
terms (Europe as a continent) based on the classifica-
tion of the FSO, and not in political terms (part of the
European Union). Our data did not allow for a more pre-
cise inclusion of ethnicity/nationality in the models be-
cause of collinearity problems, i.e., a too strong overlap
between variables of ethnicity and religion. A dichoto-
mous variable distinguishes between individuals of Swiss
nationality (be this by birth or “naturalization”) and non-
Swiss nationality.
Hostility of cantonal contextwasmeasured by adding
two variables: the percentage of support in a canton for
the anti-minaret referendum of 2009, and for the mass-
immigration referendum of 2012. The two variables are
strongly correlated (Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .960).
We also controlled for individual level variables of
age (a continuous variable), sex (female/male), and mar-
ital status (married/not married), as well as for two ad-
ditional contextual factors: the rate of unemployment in
the canton and a dichotomous variable distinguishing be-
tween individuals living in an urban or rural area.
4.3. Analytical Strategy
Following the analytical strategy of Connor and Koenig
(2015), we explain the Muslim employment gap with
a series of logistic regressions predicting employment.1
A first model only enters the Muslim/non-Muslim vari-
able (including controls) and represents the baseline
model. Every one of the followingmodels introduces one
set of mediating variables representing a specific mech-
anism. Comparing the baseline model with every one of
the following models concerning the size of the effect of
Muslim affiliation on unemployment gives us a measure
of how much of the gap can be explained by the respec-
tive mechanism.
1 We did not use multi-level modelling (with cantons as higher level) because of insufficient numbers of Muslims in several cantons.
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We checked for themulticollinearity assumption and
did not include some variables in the models or re-
work them: we do not control for linguistic region as
this variable is highly correlated with the percentage
of unemployment.
We present seven models: model 1 only includes the
religious-affiliation variable and controls; model 2 enters
human capital variables; model 3 tests religiosity; model
4 concerns migration variables; model 5 tests hostility of
cantonal context; model 6 is a full model without inter-
actions; finally, model 7 adds an educational interaction.
For each model, we indicate the odd’s ratios exp(𝛽) and
their degree of significance (p < .05). We also indicate a
measure for the difference of 𝛽-coefficient of theMuslim
affiliation of the respective model to that of the baseline
model—this is interpreted as the percentage of theMus-
lim employment gap that can be accounted for by the
mediating variables of the specified mechanism.
5. Findings
5.1. Descriptive Results
As the descriptive statistics show below (Table 1), Mus-
lims (8.9%) are more likely to be unemployed than non-
Muslims (3.5%). This represents a significant employment
gap between Muslims and non-Muslims in Switzerland.
Other differences can be found between the two
groups (Table 1). Muslims are more likely than non-
Muslims to bemale and young, and theymostly live in ur-
ban areas; Muslims are significantly less likely to have en-
tered post-school education and they are five timesmore
likely to have linguistic difficulties than non-Muslims. It is
a very new immigrant population since the majority are
from the first generation (born elsewhere and arrived af-
ter the age of 11). Most have European origins, while a
third have Swiss nationality in 2014. Interestingly, and
quite contrary to public expectations, they do not differ
in terms of intensity of religiosity. Regarding perception
of discrimination, while 8% of non-Muslims say that they
have felt discriminated against during the last 12months,
16% of the Muslim respondents mention such feelings.
This variable is not taken into account in the explicative
analysis of unemployment, but it gives us a hint at the
situation of Muslims in Switzerland.
These findings replicate what other scholars have
found about Muslims in Switzerland (Gianni et al., 2015;
Gianni, Purdie, Lathion, & Jenny, 2010). The question is,
however, whether these differences also help to explain
the Muslim employment gap. To answer this question,
we nowpresent the results of the logistic regressions pre-
dicting unemployment.
5.2. Explanatory Results
The results of mediating models in Table 2 present the
logged odds (exp(𝛽)) and their significance levels. All
models control for age, gender, marital status, unem-
ployment in the canton, and urban area. Our first model
only introduces the dichotomous variable Muslim/non-
Muslim affiliation (together with the controls) and acts
as a baseline model. It shows that, for the Swiss case,
Muslims are 2.434 times more likely to be unemployed.
This represents the “baseline Muslim employment gap”.
Table 1. Variable means and percentages by group.
Muslims Non-Muslims
Unemployed 0.089* 0.035*
Women 0.379* 0.478*
Age 34* 41*
Married 0.622* 0.495*
% of unemployment in canton 0.032 0.031
Lives in a city 0.591* 0.467*
Compulsory schooling 0.328* 0.127*
Non-compulsory schooling 0.544* 0.476*
Post-school education 0.128* 0.397*
At least one voluntary commitment 0.419* 0.534*
Minor or significant linguistic difficulties 0.331* 0.079*
Religiosity (1 to 7 scale) 2.56 2.66
— Autochthonous 0.052* 0.639*
— 1st generation (arrived after 11) 0.598* 0.265*
— 2nd generation (arrived before 12 or born in Switzerland) 0.350* 0.096*
European origin (nationality at birth) 0.788* 0.947*
Swiss passport 0.377* 0.730*
% of support in canton for anti-minaret campaign 0.567 0.573
% of support in canton for anti-mass-migration campaign 0.493* 0.501*
Felt discriminated against during the last 12 months 0.186* 0.079*
Notes: Sample limited to individuals in the labour force; * Cramer V of p < 0.05.
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Table 2. Logistic regression with exp(𝛽) coefficients predicting unemployment.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Symbolic boundaries:
Muslim affiliation
Muslim (ref: non-Muslim) 2.434*** 1.734*** 2.336*** 1.652* 2.448*** 1.373* 3.756**
Human capital
• Compulsory schooling 1.838*** 1.683** 1.615**
(ref: HE/university)
• Non-compulsory schooling 1.641*** 1.680*** 1.938***
(ref: HE/university)
• Professional education 0.696 0.746 0.840
(ref: HE/university)
• Linguistic difficulties (ref: none) 1.951*** 1.486 ** 1.535**
• Voluntary commitment 0.771* 0.775* 0.774*
(ref: no commitment)
Religiosity
Religiosity 1.143** 1.112** 1.112**
Migratory background
• First generation 1.654** 1.530** 1.535*
(ref: autochthonous)
• Second generation 1.674** 1.588** 1.635**
(ref: autochthonous)
• Citizenship (ref: non-Swiss) 0.865 .947 .928
• Non-European origin 1.981*** 0.550** 0.568***
(ref: European origin)
Hostile context
Hostility of canton 1.017* 1.018* 1.018*
Human Capital Interaction
• Compulsory schooling X Muslim 0.550
• Non-compulsory schooling 0.207***
X Muslim
• Professional education X Muslim 0.000
Constant 0.025*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.029*** 0.121*** 0.006*** 0.004***
Muslim/non-Muslim difference — 38.0% 4.7% 43.6 − 0.6% 64.4% —
explained variance(1)
Notes: Total N = 10,916 (Muslims n = 682; non-Muslims n = 10,234). Models control also for age, gender, marital status, unemploy-
ment in the canton and urban area. * = p < 0.05: ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001. (1) Calculated as (𝛽(Baseline model) − 𝛽(this
model)/(𝛽(Baseline model) for the Muslim affiliation coefficient.
In Model 2, we enter our mediating human capital
variables of education, linguistic difficulties, and volun-
tary commitment. Doing so reduces the exp(𝛽) coeffi-
cient:Muslims are in this model only 1.734more likely to
be unemployed than non-Muslims. Another way of say-
ing this is that we can account for 38% of the employ-
ment gap by introducing human capital variables. It is in-
teresting to see that both linguistic difficulties and lack
of formal education are about more or less equally im-
portant in explaining some of the employment gap (al-
though we will show in later models that the link to for-
mal education is actually a complex one).
Model 3 shows that religiosity has only very little ex-
planatory power. We can account only for 4.7% of the
unemployment differences. This result is very much in
line with previous findings by Connor and Koenig (2015,
p. 196). Our religiosity measure included frequency of
attendance at religious services, and, since mosque at-
tendance is not compulsory for women, one might sus-
pect that our results may be biased. To check for this
possibility, we ran our model separately for men and
women. The results are very similar for both groups, with
an exp(𝛽) coefficient for religiosity of 1.161** and of
1.130** respectively. We conclude that there does not
seem to be bias caused by our religiosity measure.
In Model 4, migratory variables are introduced, ac-
counting for 43.6% of the employment gap. Three points
seem to be important here. First, there is no significant
Social Inclusion, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 2, Pages 151–161 157
difference in the mediating effect of the generation vari-
able. This is surprising since one could have expected
that members of the group of second-generation immi-
grants might have more resources leading to less unem-
ployment. Second, and surprisingly, citizenship has no
significant mediating effect. Third, a very strong mediat-
ing effect can be found in the European/non-European
distinction. Non-Europeans face higher employment bar-
riers. Clearly, non-European origin is an important disad-
vantage on the Swiss labourmarket and it raises the ques-
tion of intersectionality between origins and religious
affiliation in the experience of discrimination.2 We can
note, however, that, evenwhenwe control for their Euro-
pean or non-European origin, Muslims still remain 1.652
times more likely to be unemployed than non-Muslims,
which points to specific religious discrimination.
Model 5 enters hostility of cantonal context. The ef-
fect is barely significant and controlling for this variable
does not reduce the odds of Muslim unemployment but
increases it slightly. The effect is very small and should
be interpreted with care.
Model 6 includes all sets of variables (except interac-
tions) and shows that their mediating influence accounts
for 64.4% of the unemployment differences given by the
baseline model.
Model 7 introduces an interaction between educa-
tion and Muslim affiliation. This interaction is strong and
highly significant. Introducing an interaction (or “moder-
ating effect”) means that we cannot interpret the coef-
ficients in the same way as we did in the previous mod-
els. Muslim affiliation no longer has a common overall
effect on unemployment, but different effects depend-
ing on educational achievement. Thus, Muslims with a
university degree (the reference in the education group)
are 3.756 times more likely to be unemployed than
non-Muslims in general. Compared to this group, Mus-
lims who have had post-compulsory schooling are unem-
ployed significantly less often.
The effect can be seen in Figure 1. We see that both
Muslims with compulsory education and Muslims with
university education have a significantly higher prob-
ability of being unemployed than Muslims with non-
compulsory education and professional education (al-
though, because of small N, the latter effect does not
turn out to be significant). Formal education clearly di-
minishes the probability of being unemployed when
going from compulsory to non-compulsory and profes-
sional education—but it then raises the unemployment
probability again when going to university education.
This is an interesting finding, since the literature expects
education to lower the probabilities of unemployment.
We can only speculate as to possible reasons for this
finding. Individuals with a university degree often have
an education that is less clearly geared to a profession
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Compulsory
Schooling
Non-Compulsory
Schooling
Professional
Educaon
HE/University
0
Non Muslim
Muslim
Figure 1. Probability of being unemployed for Muslims compared to non-Muslims for different levels of education.
2 According to intersectional approaches, one cannot use analytical categories such as gender, race, and class independently, in the sense that they
produce overlapping structures of inequalities (Browne & Misra, 2003). The same can be said about religious affiliation and ethnicity: they work as
“‘simultaneous and linked’ social identities” (Wilde & Glassman, 2016), and it is not always possible to distinguish discrimination mechanisms based on
one or the other.
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than individuals who have a qualification from a post-
school training institution; they may also lack social net-
works, which are useful to access the labour market af-
ter university. In such a situation, the ethno-religious
penalty may become important when competing with
non-Muslim individuals for highly attractive jobs.
We must remember, however, that, for the majority
ofMuslims in Switzerland, formal education works in the
expected direction. MostMuslims in Switzerland have ei-
ther compulsory (32.8%) or non-compulsory (54.4%) ed-
ucation, and, for them, the well-known education-leads-
to-employmentmechanismworks. It is only for a smaller
group of Muslims (12.8%) with university or professional
education that the reversemechanism seems to operate.
6. Conclusions
In this article, we have investigatedwhether (1) aMuslim
employment gap exists in Switzerland, and (2) to what
extent this gap may be attributed to human capital, mi-
gratory factors, religiosity, and a hostile societal context.
A number of results confirm what former research
in other countries or cross-country research has shown:
namely, that there is indeed a significant Muslim em-
ployment gap in Switzerland. Without controls, Muslims
have a probability of being unemployed of 8.9%, while
non-Muslims only have a probability of 3.5%. In terms
of odds and controlling for socio-demographic variables
(without education), Muslims are 2.4 times more likely
to beunemployed thannon-Muslims.Other findings that
confirm previous research are that human capital factors
and migration factors are indeed important and explain
much of the variance of the employment gap; and that
religiosity is only a veryminor factor and does not explain
much of the employment gap. We find, like much of the
literature, that the second generation of Muslims do not
fare significantly better in terms of employment than the
first generation.
Three findings are surprising and contribute to the
state of the art in a novel way.
First, we find that citizenship does not explain any
variance of the employment gap. Swiss citizenship is dif-
ficult to obtain; the criteria are strict and obtaining Swiss
citizenship means for immigrants an important invest-
ment in terms of time, energy, and money. Facilitating
naturalization is often proposed as a means of integrat-
ing immigrants further. It is therefore remarkable that
we do not find any significant effect arising from cit-
izenship. One explanation might be that citizenship is
so difficult to obtain that it cannot be a good indicator
of integration.
Second, we have used an original measure: the hos-
tility to migrants and Muslims in a cantonal context. We
find a statistically significant effect, but only a small ef-
fect that does not reduce the Muslim affiliation coef-
ficient, but rather increases it. Substantively, this can
be explained by the fact that we find unemployed Mus-
lims more often in cantons with less out-group hostility.
The reason is simply that in the very rural cantons with
the highest levels of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant at-
titudes, there are hardly any Muslims.
Our most important new finding is clearly that the ef-
fect of Muslim affiliation on unemployment is not medi-
ated, but actually moderated by human capital. We find
a powerful interaction in that Muslims with both a very
low and a very high level of education are disproportion-
ally often unemployed.
The finding is important because it means that rais-
ing the human capital of Muslims will not automatically
lessen, but may actually widen, the employment gap. It
seems worthwhile exploring this phenomenon further,
be it with additional quantitative or qualitative methods.
It would also be very interesting to see whether the find-
ing can be generalized to other contexts. If it holds and
is found to be a generalizable phenomenon, then we will
have to think differently about the relationship of human
capital and Muslim employment opportunities.
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